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1NAMIBIA Briefing
WHO’S WHO AND WHAT'S WHAT
I. People
A. President Sam NUJOMA
Charismatic. Intelligent. Not a details man but follows and uses 
briefings quite well. Amiable. Politically moderate.
B. Prime Minister Hage GEINGOB
School teacher and UN Official background. Skilled organiser and 
negotiator. Runs a tight ship. Substantively politically moderate. 
Formal and reserved.
C. Minister of Mines and Energy Andimba TOIVO YA TOIVO
Historic leader of SWAPO - 20 plus years on Robben Island. 
Intelligent, influential, not likely to be a detail man but to vet 
strategic proposals. (See Dr. Leake Hangala below.) Courtly, aged, 
moderate.
D. Minister of Labour, Public Service, Manpower and Manpower Development
Hendrik WITB00I
Grandson of the Hendrik Witbooi who led war or resistance in early 
1900s. Leader who brought South to SWAPO. Elderly, good politician, 
courtly, popular.
E. Minister of Information and Broadcasting Hidipo HAMUTENYA
More important than title would suggest. Intellectual (historian). 
Outspoken and forceful. Likely to be influential on economic and 
social strategy generally.
F. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport Nahas ANGULA
Very intelligent, forceful. Expert in education and personnel - 
likely with Hidipo to be strong influence on overall social and 
economic strategy. Also like Hidipo can be prickly although usually 
diplomatic.
2G. Minister of Foreign Affairs Theo-Ben GURIRAB
Long time UN Representative. Polished diplomat and mediator.
H. Minister of Finance Otto HERRIGEL
Namibian of German ancestry. Internal SWAPO member and adviser but 
not open leader in past. (Was # 2 European ancestry member to the 
assassinated Anton Lubowski.) Cautious. Business oriented. Wishes 
gradual change on Botswana model and to see how RSA will change. 
(Permanent Secretary Godfrey GAOSEB university educated from SWAPO- 
Luanda Finance Secretariat.)
I. Minister of Local Government and Housing Ms Libertine AMATHILA
Probably most influential woman. Very intelligent, charismatic. 
Amiable but outspoken. Holds Doctorate in public health - promoted 
from Deputy Secty. of Health in Luanda shadow cabinet.
J. Minister of Trade and Industry Ben AMATHILA
Husband of Libertine. Matric level education. Clever, follows 
economic arguments. Relatively technocratic role recently but has 
political organising background. Very quiet.
K. Minister of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism Nico BESSINGER
Leading "Coloured" member of SWAPO. Qualified architect. Internal 
leadership roles (with WITBOOI, LUBOWSKI). Deputy Ms Pendukeni 
ITHANA (formerly Kaulinge) head of Women's Council. Not very 
forceful, probably # 3 woman after Libertine AMATHILA and Netumbo
NDAITWAH (formerly Nandi).
L. Minister of Health Dr Nicky IYAMBO and Permanent Secretary Dr Solomon
AMADHILA
Both competent doctors. Commitment primary health care/health for 
all by 2000. WHO-UNICEF influence. Minister was SWAPO-Luanda Health 
Secretary (with extensive system) and Permanent Secretary was (non­
public) SWAPO member with senior health post in occupied Namibia.
M. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Netumbo NDAITWAH (formerly Nandi).
Probably # 2 woman in government. Intelligent, influential, held
major diplomatic posts for SWAPO. On UK University course 1987-89. 
Very reserved and quiet in public discussion.
Permanent Secretary Ministry of Mining and Energy Dr Leake HANGALA 
Key programmatic person. PhD (Helsinki) in mining geology. Well 
informed. Outspoken. Highly intelligent, likes to debate.
Deputy Minister of Works, Transport and Communications Klaus DIERKS 
German ancestry. Non-public SWAPO member in Namibia. Qualified 
engineer. Intelligent. Cautious.
4II. Policies - Economic/Social
A. General
Consolidation first aim, i.e. preserve slow (2-3% a year) post 1986 
recovery avoid major dislocations.
Explore options - along Botswana, Zimbabwe lines. Significant 
structural and ownership changes without flight of minority community 
capital or personnel. See what happens in RSA over next two years 
while remaining in Rand area (monetary) and Southern African Customs 
Union.
Diversify economic links to EEC, SADCC/PTA in trade/transport/ 
personnel/resource flows.
Major speech just pre-April 1989 by Hidipo Hamutenya outlines most of 
above.
B. EEC
Want ACP status. Key is 25,000 tonne (perhaps phased from 15 or 
20,000 open) beef quota to shift from RSA market. Also concerned 
fishery agreement (with help on development of personnel, vessels) 
and perhaps mutton/lamb quota. Seek 40-50 million European Units of 
Account 1990-91 transitional support. Long history 'informal' 
diplomatic and technical contacts with EEC.
C. Mines
Broad approach conversion and expansion existing sector on Botswana 
lines:
a. Joint ventures (shares for mineral use rights) up to 50-50
b. Royalty/export tax (fixed/fairly low - up to 20% total)
c. Corporation Tax (40%)
d. Additional Corporation Tax (on profits over - say - 25% on 
capital employed taking one year with another)
e. Influence on strategy governing production volume/quality of 
reserves over body being mined.
Over 90% of mining three groups:
1. Anglo/De Beers - diamonds, gold (about to come on stream),
potentially coal and uranium oxide. Probably hard bargained but
5fairly amicable. De Beers (Consolidated Diamond Mines) has de 
facto recognised miners' union and allowed SWAPO to organise 
workers for up to a decade. SWAPO sees joint marketing (i.e. De 
Beer's Central Selling Organisation) as useful to producers.
2. Rossing Uranium - uranium oxide. Problem over RTZ majority of 
equity (not of votes as minority equity already transferred from 
RSA parastatal to Namibia includes a "golden share"). Agreements 
are all post 1966 Mandate Revocation and 1971 Intl. Court 
Advisory Opinion. Therefore a strong case exists that they were 
void ab initio unlike the Consolidated Diamond Mines and Tsumeb 
group arrangements which go back to the German and Mandatory 
eras. Further RTZ has (in Namibia as globally) been grossly 
insensitive to pollution and very anti any self-organisation of 
workers. While independent Namibia will probably undertake at 
least exploratory talks with existing shareholders a hard line by 
RTZ could well lead to declaring the 1970s agreements void and 
bringing in a new (West European probably related to nuclear 
power companies) managing agent/partner.
3. Consolidated Goldfields (of Namibia). Main lead-zinc-copper- 
silver producer in Tsumeb/Otjihase group is analogous to Anglo-De 
Beers in legal status and in general probable Namibian approach. 
But CG (of SA - the parent) is much less forthcoming on JV, tax, 
labour issues. It - unlike Anglo-De Beers - has a bad reputation 
as an employer and a lurid one for strikebreaking. SWAPO is 
unlikely to stress this if CG moves to a revised tax-ownership- 
trade union recognition package but could well do so if CG digs 
in its heels. Today CG(N) is again profitable but not as 
profitable as Rossing or CDM.
Namibia will hope to develop replacement mines in base metals and 
replacement sources in diamonds. It will wish to explore 
viability (and date of desirable opening) of coal and further 
uranium mines and of the offshore (Kudu) gas deposits which 
probably overlap the (very ill-defined) marine extension of the 
(disputed) Namibia/RSA Orange River Frontier.
6D. Land
SWAPO proposes at some stage to nationalise land (like minerals) but 
not land use rights. It has no desire to re-acquire (by any means) 
all settler farms now or in the medium term. The attitudes toward,
a.) quasi-abandoned (1,000 of 5,000 farm holdings); b.) resident 
abroad (500-1,000); urban resident (2,000) and resident on ranch 
(1,000 to 1,500) are likely to diverge. Data on these groups is 
vague. How to redevelop African ranching on former European ranches 
is an area of intense discussion with both small traditional units 
and collective ranches (with Australian managers) seen as unlikely 
to work well but with visible progress at ending settler domination 
of 90% of good ranching land seen as crucial.
E. Agriculture
Namibia is likely to stress provision of seed, tools, services, 
extension market access to Northern small farmers. It will also seek 
to determine possible extensions of cropping in Northcentral and 
Northeastern plateau areas and to evaluate existing 
research/knowledge (e.g. on irrigation schemes). The same approach 
will be taken in respect to ex-'homeland' ranching.
F Fishing
Namibia will extend fishing zone to 200 km and renegotiate catch 
limits. Inshore it will also seek to hold down catch to allow 
revival of badly depleted stocks. RSA continued occupation of Walvis 
Bay and possible licensing of trawlers from there may interfere with 
conservation. (For reduced catches Luderitz can handle tinning, fish 
meal making, freezing.) Agreement including support for industry 
development will be sought with EEC.
G. Currency
Namibia intends to establish a Central Bank in 1990 and issue a 
currency in (?) 1991 but to remain in the Rand area at least through 
March 1992. A panic flight of rand notes or deposits probably would 
alter that. From some date after 1991 it is likely to emulate 
Botswana and create an independent currency.
7H. Trade
While it builds up a Customs service and enterprises (present or 
incoming) build up global sourcing capacity Namibia plans to stay in 
South African Customs Union Arrangements (SACUA). The 2 year interim 
decision depends on negotiating a formula as RSA-SWA transfers have 
in practice been ad hoc. Namibia's own analysis suggests medium term 
gains in radical shifts of import sources from RSA to EEC and Far 
East (EEC being main export market now).
I. Banking
Namibia will need to restructure a series of inherited state 
development, housing, agricultural banks. It might welcome partners 
such as CDC and its Dutch and German analogues in this. It will wish 
ex-Barclays and Standard Bank of SWA systems to remain but to be 
retransferred to Barclays and Standard London (analogous to 
Botswana). These dominate commercial banking. If Namibia decides to 
follow the Zimbabwe example there is a small local-German-RSA owned 
bank in which it might buy a majority (or consolidate with the 
Afrikaner banks' small 'SWA-Namibia' networks which they may be eager 
to sell).
J. Transport
RSA divided rail transport last year on terms disadvantageous to 
Namibia. It has very old rolling stock and especially locomotives. 
But the overuse of rail for RSA purposes means that massive fleet 
upgrading may not be needed as the whole railing of goods to and from 
RSA is uneconomic (sea and/or road would be cheaper).
Port development by 2000 will turn on a set of jetties, etc. at 
(usually dry) estuary of Swakop River well up from Walvis Bay but 
protected by same spit. Interim use of WB depends on:
a. RSA's possible evacuation on basis legal basis of its claim had 
lapsed;
b. RSA's attitude on transit rights/charges if it stays in WB;
c. General RSA-Namibia relations.
8Previously SWAPO was pessimistic and looked to early alternative 
facility building. Since de Klerk's initiatives Namibia is likely to 
"wait and see". If RSA does not destabilise Namibia, levies 
reasonable charges and shifts cargo promptly and negotiates (even in 
slow motion) on transfer - Namibia is likely to continue to use WB. 
(It would assume a post apartheid/broad electorate SA government 
would hand over Walvis Bay so would not see a need to force 
negotiations now.)
K. RSA's Raising External Loans for SWA
After 1966 and 1971 the RSA Administrator General in Windhoek raised 
funds from financial institutions in RSA (secondarily in SWA and 
peripherally in Europe) for use by the SWA (Occupation) Government. 
These loans were fully guaranteed by the RSA Treasury.
As the RSA occupation was viewed as unlawful throughout the period 
these debts are RSA debts not Namibian. Namibia did not incur them 
and would not be dishonouring its or a lawful predecessor's 
obligations by telling holders of the paper to go to RSA Treasury.
At the 1987/88 peak perhaps R 800 million was outstanding. RSA via 
its AG in Windhoek has since been rather desperately trying, a.) to 
pay off much of debt and, b.) to get more of it shifted to balance 
sheets of SWA/Namibia branches or subsidiaries. By March 21 it is 
likely debt outstanding may be below R 400 million with up to R 150- 
200 million on Namibia (not RSA) balance sheets. Whether under those 
conditions (on assumption RSA would not honour its guarantee in 
respect to Namibian holders) Namibia would choose to pay as an act of 
goodwill is unclear.
L. Education
Namibia's national language is English. But not over 25% of 
Namibians speak it. Adult English teaching (verbal/literacy), 
retraining teachers, etc., have been discussed in detail by SWAPO 
with British Council, Commonwealth Secretariat so an articulated 
basis for cooperation exists in this field.
9M . Elections
The Constituent Assembly is to be the Lower (main) Chamber of the 
National Assembly. An Upper Chamber on a regional basis (with 
limited powers) is to be created. Similarly local governments - 
district and urban are to be elected. Defining constituencies, etc., 
will prove rather complex. Elections are likely to be late in 1990. 
They will be multi-party. However, the main opposition group - the 
DTA - was an anti-SWAPO alliance funded by RSA and backed by RSA 
administration. Its raison d'etre appears to be exhausted. (The 
white settlers backed a party of their own which has 3 seats of 72.) 
Thus 80% to 95% SWAPO seats in these elections is not unlikely - 
especially if single member, first past the post constituencies are 
used. Namibia would then except for lower chamber of National 
Assembly be de facto one party. If that happened a new National 
Assembly (lower chamber) election would be likely. Any early attempt 
to amend multi-party provisions of Constitution is unlikely. In a 
sense Botswana model (10 to 15% opposition seats in Assembly but a 
few opposition local councils and a multi-party system) would then be 
likely.
N . Commerce
There may be programmes to ease access to (not necessarily subsidise) 
credit and to provide training in accounting, marketing, etc., for 
small scale African traders and transporters - private and co-op. At 
international trade level Namibia will wish to see capacity to source 
globally (not just consult RSA catalogues). It is likely to be quite 
pragmatic on how - e.g. foreign trading companies (probably 
UK/Scandinavia); joint ventures between them and a public sector 
development corporation; joint ventures with Namibian (not RSAan) 
large commercial groups (2 or 3).
0. Press
There are likely to be 2 to 4 newspapers. The Namibian has been 
independent, pro-SWAPO and under Namibia's leading journalist (Gwen 
Lister) is likely to remain so. An independent press trust to own it 
is quite possible but probably not seen as a matter of urgency. 
Whether SWAPO will set up a Party daily is unclear. One to three 
other papers are likely to survive catering to business and settler
10
markets but which ones is less clear. The strong religious press is 
likely to continue. So long as reconciliation internally and 
correctness in relations with RSA survive a free climate of 
discussion and criticism are likely.
P. Finance
Namibia's (SWA's) 1989-90 budget was peculiar. Abstracting net 
1 debt1 repayment (see K) above it had a surplus of revenue over 
capital plus recurrent spending. Further revenue looked 15 to 25% 
understated. (Supplementaries have already raised it 10 to 15%.)
Thus it is not clear that independent Namibia inherits a fiscal 
morass.
Savings on multiple ethnic authority/service costs could be up to 15% 
of spending. If 'debt' is not accepted as valid that could be 10% 
saving. And Namibia as a lower middle income country can reasonably 
expect soft external finance for much of capital budget.
Assuming rapid demobilisation of elements of all previous armed 
forces and run-down of ethnic authorities is possible combined with 
net inflows for capital investment of $75-100 million, Namibia should 
be able to achieve a balanced recurrent budget and avoid using 
inflationary finance for investment consistent with broadening basic 
service access and avoiding overall tax increases. The three basic 
SWAPO fiscal goals are non-inflationary finance - no overall increase 
in tax burden (some restructuring) - move to universal access to 
basic services. The conflict among these is likely to come if 
universal 4 to 6 year secondary education is attempted by 1995.
(This is parallel to similar problem from such an effort in 
Zimbabwe.)
Q. Sanctions
Whatever stance is taken on sanctions against RSA, sanctions against 
Namibia which flow from its ex-occupation should be raised 21-111-90 
or sooner. SWAPO has not made a major point of this because it has 
assumed it to be self-evident. That may not be the case when the 
Namibian element in sanctions against RSA is included in legislation
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and statutory orders (as it certainly is in USA); so that review of 
the actual UK/EEC position would appear prudent.
R. International Water Rights
Angola-Botswana-Namibia will need to negotiate user and river basin 
management agreements on rivers rising in Angola and running into or 
on border with Namibia or (in case of Okavango) crossing Namibia 
(where it is used for irrigation on a small scale already) to 
Botswana. Technical assistance to ascertain facts will be needed and 
some trade-offs may require bargaining but goodwill and an agreement 
can be expected. Problems on the Orange River waters will be 
greater. RSA claims the German Colonial Boundary was North Bank not 
thalweg. (Inconsistently it argued thalweg on Kunene River Boundary 
with Angola.) Namibia and at least some international lawyers do not 
accept this. Namibia will claim downstream water rights on Orange.
As Rand (by diversion of Orange River upstream - Highlands Water 
Project) and Northwest Cape (Uppington irrigated area) also need the 
water while Southern Namibia's crop development turns on irrigation 
this case is likely to lead to abrasive negotiations even with 
goodwill. Given the angular or undulating course of Orange River 
Frontier the offshore extension of Namibia-RSA border is subject to 
real doubt. The area concerned has fish stocks, probable natural 
gas, possible oil.
RHG
Falmer
26-11-90
S W A P O  A N N O U N C E S  S H A D O W  C A B IN E T  A N D  
G O V E R N M E N T  S E R V IC E  A P P O IN T M E N T S
On December 21, 1989, SWAPO announced the 
creation of a sixteen member Shadow Cabinet, with 
deputies and permanent secretaries.
The Cabinet of the new Namibian government which 
will take office on independence day, March 21, will 
consist of a President, a Prime Minister and sixteen 
ministers.
PRESIDENCY
FYesident: Sam Nujoma
Permanent Secretary: not yet appointed
OFFICE OF THE PRIM E M INISTER 
Prime Minister Hage Geingob
Permanent Secretary: Nangolo Mbumba
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
Minister Hifikepunye Pohamba
Deputy Minister Nangolo Ithete
Permanent Secretary: Ndali Kamati
M INISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Minister TTieo-Ben Gunrab
Deputy Minister Netumbo Ndaitwah
Permanent Secretary: Andreas Guibeb
M INISTRY OF DEFENCE
Minister Peter Mueshihange
Deputy Minister Fhillemon Malima
Permanent Secretary: Frans Kapofi
MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
Minister Otto Herrigel
Deputy Minister not yet appointed
Permanent Secretary: Godfrey Gaoseb
M INISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND 
SPORT
Minister Nahas Angula
Deputy Minister Buddy Wentworth
Permanent Secretary: Vitalis Ankama
MINISTRY OF INFORM ATION AND 
BROADCASTING
Minister Hidipo Hamutenya
Deputy Minister Daniel Tjongarero
Permanent Secretary: Vezera Kandetu
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES 
Minister: Dr Nicky Iyambo
Deputy Minister: not yet appointed
Permanent Secretary: Dr Solomon Amadhila
MINISTRY OF LABOUR, PU BLIC  SERVICE AND 
MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT
Minister Hendrik Witbooi
Deputy Minister Hadino Hishongwa 
Permanent Secretary: Tuli Hiveluah
MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY 
Minister Andimba Toivo ya Toivo
Deputy Minister: Helmut Angula
Permanent Secretary: Dr Leake Hangala
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Minister Ngarikutuke Tjiriange
Deputy Minister Reinhard Rukoro
Permanent Secretary: Dr Albert Kawana
MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND 
HOUSING
Minister Dr Libertine Amathila
Deputy Minister Jerry Ekandjo 
Permanent Secretary: Nghidimondjila Shoombe
MINISTRY OF WILDLIFE, CONSERVATION AND 
TOURISM
Minister Nico Bessinger
Deputy Minister Pendukeni Ithana
Permanent Secretary: Hanno Rumpf
M INISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
Minister Ben Amathila
Deputy Minister Reggie Diergaardt
Permanent Secretary: Tsudao Gurirab
M INISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES, 
WATER AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Minister Gerhard Hanekom
Deputy Minister: Dr Kaire Mbuende
Assistants: Vilho Hipondoka
Calle Schlettwein
MINISTRY OF WORKS, TRANSPORT AND 
COMMUNICATIONS
Minister Richard Kapelwa
Deputy Minister Klaus Dierks
Permanent Secretary: Dr Peingeondjabi Shipoh
M INISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND 
REHABILITATION
Minister Marco Hausiku
Deputy Minister: Dr Marcus Shivute
Permanent Secretary: Ulitala Hiveluah
Government Service Appointments
NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION:
Director General-Dr Zedekia Ngavirue
MINISTER OF STATE FOR SECURITY:
Peter Tsheehama
ATTORNEY GENERAL:
Hartmut Ruppel
AUDITOR GENERAL: not yet appointed
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